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Often adaptive, distributed control can be viewed as an iterated game between independent
players. The coupling between the players’ mixed strategies, arising as the system evolves from one
instant to the next, is determined by the system designer. Information theory tells us that the most
likely joint strategy of the players, given a value of the expectation of the overall control objective
function, is the minimizer of a Lagrangian function of the joint strategy. So the goal of the system
designer is to speed evolution of the joint strategy to that Lagrangian minimizing point, lower the
expectated value of the control objective function, and repeat. Here we elaborate the theory of
algorithms that do this using local descent procedures, and that thereby achieve efficient, adaptive,
distributed control.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the problem of adaptive dis-
tributed control [1, 2, 3]. Typically in such problems,
at each time t each control agent i sets its state xti inde-
pendently of the other agents, by sampling an associated
distribution, qti(x
t
i). Rather than directly via statisti-
cal dependencies of the agents’ states at the same time t,
the coupling between the agents arises indirectly, through
the stochastic joint evolution of their distributions {qti}
across time.
More formally, let time be discrete, where at the be-
ginning of each t every agent sets its state (“makes its
move”), and then the rest of the system responds. Indi-
cate the state of the entire system at time t as zt. (zt
includes xt, as well as all stochastic elements not being di-
rectly controlled.) So the joint distribution of the moves
of the agents at any moment t is given by the product dis-
tribution qt(xt) =
∏
i q
t
i(x
t
i), and the state of the entire
system, given joint move xt, is governed by P (zt | xt).
Now in general the observations by agent i of aspects
of the system’s state at times previous to t will determine
qti . So q
t
i is statistically dependent on the previous states
of the entire system, z{t
′<t}. In other words, the agents
can be viewed as players in a repeated game with Nature,
each playing mixed strategies {qti} at moment t [4, 5, 6,
7, 8]. Their interdependence arises through information
sets and the like, in the usual way.
From this perspective what the designer of a dis-
tributed control system can specify is the stochastic
laws governing the updating of the joint strategy. In
other words, the designer wishes to impose a stochas-
tic dynamics on a Multi-Agent System (MAS) that op-
timizes an overall objective function of the state of the
system in which the MAS is embedded, F (z).[32] For-
mally, this means inducing a joint strategy q(x) with a
good associated value of Eq(F ) =
∫
dxq(x)E(F | x) ≡∫
dxq(x)G(x).[33] Once such a q is found, one can sample
it to get a final x, and be assured that, on average, the
associated F value is low. G is called the world utility.
In this paper we elaborate a set of algorithms that
iteratively update qt in such a manner. The algo-
rithms presented here are based on using steepest descent
techniques to minimize a G-parameterized Lagrangian,
LG(q).[34] Because the descent is over Euclidean vectors
q, these algorithms can be applied whether the xi are cat-
egorical, continuous, time-extended, or a mixture of the
three. So in particular, they provide a principled way to
do “gradient descent over categorical variables”.
In the next section we first derive the Lagrangian
LG(q) and discuss some of its properties.
In the following section we show how to apply gradi-
ent descent (and its embellishments) to optimization of
the Lagrangian. If we view the agents as engaged in a
team game, all having the same utility G, then this gra-
dient descent is a distributed scheme for each agent to
update its strategy, in a way that will steer the game to
a bounded rational equilibrium [9, 14].
In this section we also consider second order methods.
In contrast to gradient descent, in general any single ap-
plication of Newton’s method to update a product dis-
tribution q will result in a new distribution p(q) that is
not a product distribution. So we must instead solve for
the product distribution q′(p) having minimal Kullback-
Leibler distance to p. In this section we derive the rule
for iterative updating of our distribution so as to move q
in the direction of q′(p(q)).
In practice any local descent scheme often requires
Monte Carlo sampling to estimate terms in the gradient.
To minimize the expected quadratic error of the estima-
tion, typically the game is changed from being a team
game. In other words, in general changing the agent’s
utilities gi to not all equal G will result in lower bias plus
variance of the estimation of the gradient, and therefore
will speed evolution to a good joint strategy. These and
other techniques for shrinking bias plus variance are dis-
cussed in [10, 11].
We end this section by mentioning some other tech-
niques for improving the Monte Carlo sampling. These
include data-aging, and techniques for managing the de-
2scent when it gets close to a border of the (simplex of)
allowed q, Q. Most of these techniques introduced can
be used even with schemes for minimizing LG(q) other
than gradient descent.
In the final section we introduce some alternatives to
LG(q), designed to help speed convergence to a q with
low E(G). Miscellaneous proofs can be found in the ap-
pendix.
The general mathematical framework for casting con-
trol and optimization problems in terms of minimizing
Lagangians of probability distributions is known as the
theory of probability Lagangians. The precise version
where the probability distributions are product distri-
butions is known as “Product Distribution” (PD) the-
ory. [11]. It has many deep connections to other fields,
including bounded rational game theory and statistical
physics [14]. As such it serves as a mathematical bridge
connecting these disciplines. Some initial experimental
results concerning the use of PD theory for distributed
optimization and distributed control can be found in
[15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. See [10, 13, 21] for other uses
and extensions of PD theory.
II. PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION LAGRANGIANS
A. The maxent Lagrangian
Say the designer stipulates a particular desired value
of E(G), γ. For simplicity, consider the case where the
designer has no other knowledge concerning the system
besides γ and the fact that the joint strategy is a product
distribution. Then information theory tells us that the
a priori most likely q consistent with that information is
the one that maximizes entropy subject to that informa-
tion [22, 23, 24].[35] In other words, of all distributions
that agree with the designer’s information, that distribu-
tion is the “easiest” one to induce by random search.
Given this, one can view the job of the designer of a
distributed control system as an iterative equilibration
process. In the first stage of each iteration the designer
works to speed evolution of the joint strategy to the q
with maximal entropy subject to a particular value of γ.
Once we have found such a solution we can replace the
constraint — replace the target value of E(G) — with
a more difficult one, and then repeat the process, with
another evolution of q [11].
Define the maxent Lagrangian by
L(q) ≡ β(Eq(G)− γ)− S
= β(
∫
dxq(x)G(x) − γ)− S(q), (1)
where S(q) is the Shannon entropy of q,
−
∫
dxq(x)ln q(x)
µ(x) , and for simplicity we here take
the prior µ to be uniform.[36]. Writing it out, for a given
γ, the associated most likely joint strategy is given by
the q that minimizes L(q) over all those (q, β) such that
the Lagrange parameter β is at a critical point of L, i.e.,
such that ∂L
∂β
= 0.
Solving, we find that the qi are related to each other
via a set of coupled Boltzmann equations (one for each
agent i),
qβi (xi) ∝ e
−βE
q
β
(i)
(G|xi)
(2)
where the overall proportionality constant for each i is
set by normalization, the subscript qβ(i) on the expecta-
tion value indicates that it is evaluated according to the
distribution
∏
j 6=i qj , and β is set to enforce the condition
Eqβ (G) = γ. Following Nash, we can use Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem to establish that for any fixed β, there
must exist at least one solution to this set of simultane-
ous equations.
If we evaluate E(G) at the solution qβ , we find that it
is a declining function of β. So in following the iterative
procedure of equilibrating and then lowering γ we we will
raise β. Accordingly, we can avoid the steps of testing
whether each successive constraint E(G) = γ is met, and
simply monotonically increase β instead. This allows us
to avoid ever explicitly specifying the values of γ.
Simulated annealing is an example of doing this, where
rather than work directly with q, one works with random
samples of it formed via the Metropolis random walk
algorithm [25, 26, 27, 28]. There is no a priori reason to
use such an inefficient means of manipulating q however.
Here we will work with q directly instead. This will result
in an algorithm that is not simply “probabilistic” in the
sense that the updating of its variables is stochastic (as
in simulated annealing). Rather the very entity being
updated is a probability distribution.
B. Shape of the maxent Lagrangian
Consider L as a function of q, with β and γ both
treated as fixed parameters. (So in particular, Eq(g) need
not equal γ.) First, say that q(i) is also held fixed, with
only qi allowed to vary. This makes E(g) linear in qi.
In addition, entropy is a concave function, and the unit
simplex is a convex region. Accordingly, the Lagrangian
of Eq. 1 has a unique local minimum over qi. So there is
no issue of choosing among multiple minima when all of
q(i) is fixed. Nor is there any problem of “getting trapped
in a local minimum” in a computational search for that
minimum. Indeed, in this situation we can just jump
directly to that global optimum, via Eq. 2.
Now introduce the shorthand for any function U(x),
[U ]i,p(xi) ≡
∫
dx(i)U(xi, x(i))p(x(i) | xi).
So [G]i,q(i) (xi) is agent i’s “effective” cost function,
Eq(i)(G | xi). Consider the value Eqβ
i
([G]i,q(i) ). This is
the value of E(G) at i’s bounded rational equilibrium for
the fixed q(i), i.e., it is the value at the minimum over qi of
3L. View that value as a function of β. One can show that
this is a decreasing function. In fact, its derivative just
equals the negative of the variance of [G]i,q(i)(xi) evalu-
ated under distribution qβi (xi) (see appendix). Combin-
ing this with the fact that E(G) is bounded below (for
bounded G), establishes that the variance must go to zero
for large enough β. So as β grows, qβi (xi) → 0 for all xi
that don’t minimize Eq(i)(G | xi). In other words, in that
limit, qi becomes Nash-optimal.
Next consider varying over all q ∈ Q, the space of
all product distributions q. This is a convex space; if
p ∈ Q and p′ ∈ Q, then so is any distribution on the line
connecting p and p′. However over this space, the E(G)
term in L is multilinear. So L is not a simple convex
function of q. So we do not have guarantees of a single
local minimum.
The following lemma extends the technique of La-
grange parameters to off-equilibrium points:
Lemma 1: Consider the set of all vectors leading from
x′ ∈ Rn that are, to first order, consistent with a set
of constraints over Rn, {fi(x) = 0}. Of those vectors,
the one giving the steepest ascent of a function V (x) is
~u = ∇V +
∑
i λi∇fi, up to an overall proportionality
constant, where the λi enforce the first order consistency
conditions, ~u · ∇fi = 0 ∀i.
Now examine the derivatives of S(q) with respect to
all components of q, i.e., the q-gradient of the entropy.
At the border of Q, at least one of the ln(qi) terms in
those derivatives will be negative infinite. Combined with
Lemma 1, this can be used to establish that at the edge
of Q, the steepest descent direction of any player’s La-
grangian points into the interior of Q (assuming finite β
and {G}). (This is reflected in the equilibrium solutions
Eq. 2.) Accordingly, whereas Nash equilibria can be on
the edge ofQ (e.g., for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium),
in bounded rational games any equilibrium must lie in the
interior of Q. In other words, any equilibrium (i.e., any
local minimum) of a bounded rational game has non-zero
probability for all joint moves. So just as when only vary-
ing a single qi, we never have to consider extremal mixed
strategies in searching for equilibria over all Q. We can
use local descent schemes instead [15, 19, 29].
Lemma 1 can also be used to construct G with more
than one solution to Eq. 2. One can also show that for
every player i and any point q interior to Q, there are di-
rections inQ along which i’s Lagrangian is locally convex.
Accordingly, no player’s Lagrangian has a local maximum
interior to Q. So if there are multiple local minima of i’s
Lagrangian, they are separated by saddle points across
ridges. In addition, the uniform q is a solution to the set
of coupled equations Eq. 2, but typically is not a local
minimum, and therefore must be a saddle point.
Say that we were not restricting ourselves to prod-
uct distributions. So the Lagrangian becomes L(p) =
β(Ep(G) − γ) − S(p), where p can now be any distribu-
tion over x. There is only one local minimum over p of
this Lagrangian, the canonical ensemble:
pβ(x) ∝ e−βG(x)
In general pβ is not a product distribution. However we
can ask what product distribution is closest to it.
Now in general, the proper way to approximate a tar-
get distribution p with a distribution from a subset C
of the set of all distributions is to first specify a misfit
measure saying how well each member of C approximates
p, and then solve for the member with the smallest mis-
fit. This is just as true when C is the set of all product
distributions as when it is any other set.
How best to measure distances between probability dis-
tributions is a topic of ongoing controversy and research
[30]. The most common way to do so is with the infi-
nite limit log likelihood of data being generated by one
distribution but misattributed to have come from the
other. This is know as the Kullback-Leibler distance
[22, 23, 31]:
KL(p1 || p2) ≡ S(p1 || p2)− S(p1) (3)
where S(p1 || p2) ≡ −
∫
dx p1(x)ln[
p2(x)
µ(x) ] is known as
the cross entropy from p1 to p2 (and as usual we im-
plicitly choose uniform µ). The KL distance is always
non-negative, and equals zero iff its two arguments are
identical.
As shorthand, define the “pq distance” as KL(p || q),
and the “qp distance” as KL(q || p), where p is our tar-
get distribution and q is a product distribution. Then
it is straightforward to show that the qp distance from q
to target distribution pβ is just the maxent Lagrangian
L(q), up to irrelevant overall constants. In other words,
the q minimizing the maxent Lagrangian is q with the
minimal qp distance to the associated canonical ensem-
ble.
However the qp distance is the (infinite limit of the
negative log of) the likelihood that distribution p would
attribute to data generated by distribution q. It can be
argued that a better measure of how well q approximates
p would be based on the likelihood that q attributes to
data generated by p. This is the pq distance; it gives a
different Lagrangian from that of Eq. 1.
Evaluating, up to an overall additive constant (of the
canonical distribution’s entropy), the pq distance is
KL(p || q) = −
∑
i
∫
dx p(x)ln[qi(xi)].
This is equivalent to a game where each coordinate i has
the “Lagrangian”
L∗i (q) ≡ −
∫
dxi pi(xi)ln[qi(i)], (4)
where pi(xi) is the marginal distribution
∫
dx(i)p(x). The
minimizer of this is just qi = pi ∀i, i.e., each qi is set to
the associated marginal distribution of p.
In the interests of space, the rest of this paper we
restrict attention to the pq KL distance and associated
maxent Lagrangian.
4III. DESCENT OF THE MAXENT
LAGRANGIAN
A. Gradient descent
Consider the situation where each xi can take on a
finite number of possible values, |ξi|. Say we are iter-
atively evolving q to minimize L for some fixed β, and
are currently at some point q ∈ Q. Using Lemma 1, we
can evaluate the direction from q within Q that, to first
order, will result in the largest drop in the value of L(q):
∂L(q)
∂qi(xi = j)
= ui(j)−
∑
x′
i
ui(x
′
i)/|ξi|, (5)
where ui(j) ≡ βE(G | xi = j) + ln[qi(j)]. (Intuitively,
the reason for subtracting
∑
x′
i
ui(x
′
i)/|ξi| is to keep the
distribution in the set of all possible probability distribu-
tions over x, P .)
Eq. 5 specifies the change that each agent should make
to its distribution to have them jointly implement a step
in steepest descent of the maxent Lagrangian. These up-
dates are completely distributed, in the sense that each
agent’s update at time t is independent of any other
agents’ update at that time. Typically at any t each
agent i knows qi(t) exactly, and therefore knows ln[qi(j)].
However often it will not know G and/or the q(i). In such
cases it will not be able to evaluate the E(G | xi = j)
terms in Eq. 5 in closed form.
One way to circumvent this problem is to have those
expectation values be simultaneously estimated by all
agents by repeated Monte Carlo sampling of q to pro-
duce a set of (x,G(x)) pairs. Those pairs can then be
used by each agent i to estimate the values E(G | xi = j),
and therefore how it should update its distribution. In
the simplest version of such an update to q only occurs
once every L time-steps. In this scheme only the samples
(x,G(x)) formed within a block of L successive time-steps
are used at the end of that block by the agents to update
their distributions (according to Eq. 5).
B. Higher order descent schemes
In general, second order descent (e.g., Newton’s
method) of the maxent Lagrangian is non-trivial, due
to coupling that arises between the agents and the re-
quirement for associated matrix inversion. However re-
call that one way to motivate the entropic product dis-
tribution Lagrangian L(q) starts by saying that what we
really want is the fully coupled canonical ensemble dis-
tribution, pβ(x) ∝ exp(−βG(x)). L(q) then measures
qp KL-distance to that desired distribution. From this
perspective, any given iteration of second order descent
of the maxent Lagrangian runs downhill on a quadratic
approximation to a distribution, a distribution that is it-
self a product distribution approximation to the ultimate
distribution we want to minimize.
This suggests the alternative of making the approxi-
mations in the opposite order. In this approach we first
make a quadratic approximation (over the space of all
p, not just all q) to the maxent Lagrangian, L(p). Via
Newton’s method this specifies a p∗ that minimizes that
quadratic approximation. We can then find the product
distribution that is nearest (in pq KL distance) to p∗.
This scheme is called Nearest Newton descent.
The gradient and Hessian of L(p) are given by
∂L
∂p(x)
|p=p0 = βG(x) + 1 + ln(p
0(x))
∂2L
∂p(x)∂p(x′)
|p=p0 =
δx,x′
p0(x)
where p0 is the current point. This Hessian is positive-
definite (given that the current p is a member of P).
By simple Lagrange parameters, the general solution is
either on the border of P , or if in the interior is given by
p∗(x) = −p0(x)
[
βG(x) + ln(p(x)) + λ
]
where λ is set by normalization. Solving, either p∗ is on
the edge of the simplex, or
p∗(x)
p0(x)
= 1− S(p0)− ln(p0(x))− β[G(x) − E(G)].
Note that the right-hand side is exactly the direction
you should go using (simplex-constrained) gradient de-
scent of L(p). So the direction to p∗ from p0 is given by
the Hadamard product of p0 and the direction given by
gradient descent.
Now we can approximate p∗ with the product distri-
bution having the minimal KL distance to it. In partic-
ular, consider using pq KL distance rather than qp KL
distance. Recall that for this kind of KL distance, the op-
timal product distribution approximation to a joint dis-
tribution is given by the product of the marginals of that
joint distribution (see the discussion just below Eq. 4).
Say that p0 is in the form of a product distribution, q0,
i.e., that we are starting from a product distribution.
Then calculating the marginals of the associated p∗ to
get q∗ is trivial:
q∗i (j)
q0i (j)
= 1 − S(q0i )− ln(q
0
i (j))
− β[E(G | xi = j)− E(G)] (6)
Note that since the original quadratic approximation
was over the full joint space, this formula automatically
takes into account inter-agent couplings. In practice of
course, it may make sense not to jump all the way from
q0 to q∗, but only part-way there, to be conservative. (In
5fact, if q∗ isn’t in the interior of the simplex, such partial
jumping is necessary.) One potential guide to how far to
jump is the pq KL distance from p∗ to
∏
i q
∗
i . Unlike the
KL distances to the full joint Boltzmann distribution, we
can readily calculate this KL distance.
The conditional expectations in Nearest Newton are
the same as those in gradient descent. Accordingly, they
too can be estimated via Monte Carlo sampling, if need
be. It’s also worth noting that Eq. 6 has the same form
as one would get by evaluating the Hessian of the maxent
Lagrangian, so long as one ignored inter-agent aspects of
that Hessian.
C. Practical issues
In practice, the block-wise Monte Carlo sampling to
estimate descent directions described above can be pro-
hibitively slow. The estimates typically have high vari-
ance, and therefore require large block size L to get a
good descent direction. One set of ways to address this
is to replace the team game with a non-team game, i.e.,
for each agent i have it estimate quantities E(gi | xi = j)
rather than E(G | xi = j), where each private util-
ity gi is chosen to have much lower variance than G
[10, 11, 15].[37]
Another useful technique is to allow samples from pre-
ceding blocks to be re-used. One does this by first “ag-
ing” that data to reflect the fact that it was formed under
a different q(i) . For example, one can replace the empir-
ical average for the most recent block k,
Gˆi,j(k) ≡
∑kL+L
t=kL G(x
t)δxt
i
,j∑kL+L
t=kL δxti,j
with a weighted average over the expected G’s of all pre-
ceding blocks,
∑
m Gˆi,j(m)e
−κ(k−m)∑
m e
−κ(k−m)
for some appropriate aging constant κ.[38]
Typically such ageing allows L to be vastly reduced,
and therefore the overall minimization of L to be greatly
sped up. For such small L though, it may be that the
most recent block has no samples of some move xi = j.
This would mean that Gˆi,j(k) is undefined. One crude
way to avoid such problems is to simply force a set of
samples of each such move if they don’t occur of their own
accord, being careful to have the x(i) formed by sampling
q(i) when forming those forced samples.
Other useful techniques allow one to properly decrease
the step size as one nears the border of Q.
IV. OTHER LAGRANGIANS FOR FINDING
MINIMA OF G
There are many alternative Lagrangians to the ones
described above. The section focuses on such alterna-
tive Lagrangians for the purpose of finding argminxG(x).
Two classes of such Lagrangians are investigated: vari-
ants of the Maxent Lagrangians, and variants of the two
types of KL-distance Lagrangians.
A. Maxent Lagrangians
Say that after finding the q that minimizes the La-
grangian, we IID sample that q, K times. We then take
the sample that has the smallest G value as our guess for
the x that minimizes G(x). For this to give a low x we
don’t need the mean of the distribution q(G) to be low
— what we need is that the bottom tail of that distribu-
tion is low. This suggests that in the E(G) term of the
Maxent Lagrangian we replace
q(x) →
q(x)
Θ[κ−
∫
dx′ q(x′)Θ[G(x)−G(x′)]]
κ
where Θ is the Heaviside theta function. This new mul-
tiplier of G is still a probability distribution over x. It
equals 0 if G(x) is in the worst 1− κ percentile (accord-
ing to distribution q) of G values, and κ−1 otherwise. So
under this replacement the E(G) term in the Lagrangian
equals the average of G restricted to that lower κ’th per-
centile. For κ = K−1, our new Lagrangian forces atten-
tion in setting q on that outlier likely to come out of the
K-fold sampling of q(G).
One can use gradient descent and Monte Carlo sam-
pling to minimize this Lagrangian, in the usual way. Note
that the Monte Carlo process includes sampling the prob-
ability distribution
Θ[κ−
∫
dx′ q(x′)Θ[G(x)−G(x′)]]
κ
as well as
the qi. This means that only those points in the best
κ’th percentile are kept, and used for all Monte Carlo
estimates. This may cause greater noise in the Monte
Carlo sampling than would be the case for κ = 1.
As an example, say that for agent i, all of its moves
have the same value of E(G | xi), and similarly for agent
j, and say that G is optimal if agents i and j both make
move 0. Then if we modify the updating so that agent
i only considers the best values that arose when it made
move 0, and similarly for agent j, then both will be
steered to prefer to make move 0 to their alternatives.
This will cause them to coordinate their moves in an op-
timal manner.
A similar modification is to replace G with f(G)
in the maxent Lagrangian, for some concave nowhere-
decreasing function f(.). Intuitively, this will have the
effect of coordinating the updates of the separate qi at
the end of the block, in a way to help lower G. It does
this by distorting G to accentuate those x’s with good
6values. The price paid for this is that there will be more
variance in the values of f(G) returned by the Monte
Carlo sampling than those of G, in general.
Note that if q is a local minimum of the Lagrangian
for G, in general it will not be a local minimum for the
Lagrangian of f(G) (the gradient will no longer be zero
under that replacement, in general). So we can replace
G with f(G) when we get stuck in a local minimum,
and then return to G once q gets away from that local
minimum. In this way we can break out of local minima,
without facing the penalty of extra variance. Of course,
none of these advantages in replacing G with f(G) hold
for algorithms that directly search for an x giving a good
G(x) value; x is a local minimum of G(x)⇔ x is a local
minimum of f(G(x)).
An even simpler modification to the E(G) term than
those considered above is to replace G(x) with Θ[G(x)−
K]. Under this replacement the E(G) term becomes the
probability that G(x) > K. So minimizing it will push q
to x with lower G values. For this modified Lagrangian,
the gradient descent update steps adds the following to
each qi(xi):
α
[
βq(G < K | xi) + ln(qi(xi))
−
∑
x′
i
βq(G < K | x′i) + ln(qi(x
′
i))∑
x′
i
1
]
.
In gradient descent of the Maxent Lagrangian we must
Monte Carlo estimate the expected value of a real number
(G). In contrast, in gradient descent of this modified
Lagrangian we Monte Carlo estimate the expected value
of a single bit: whether G exceeds K. Accordingly, the
noise in the Monte Carlo estimation for this modified
Lagrangian is usually far smaller.
In all these variants it may make sense to replace the
Heaviside function with a logistic function or an exponen-
tial. In addition, in all of them the annealing schedule
for K can be set by periodically searching for the K that
is (estimated to be) optimal, just as one searches for op-
timal coordinate systems [11, 14]. Alternatively, a simple
heuristic is to have K at the end of each block be set so
that some pre-fixed percentage of the sampled points in
the block go into our calculation of how to update q.
Yet another possibility is to replace E(G) with the
κ’th percentile G value, i.e., with the K such that∫
dx′ q(x′)Θ(G(x′) − K) = κ. (To evaluate the partial
derivative of that k with respect a particular qi(xi) one
must use implicit differentiation.)
B. KL-based Lagrangians
Both the qp-KL Lagrangian and pq-KL Lagrangians
discussed above had the target distribution be a Boltz-
mann distribution over G. For high enough β, such a
distribution is peaked near argminxG(x). So sampling
an accurate approximation to it should give an x with
low G, if β is large enough. This is why one way to min-
imize G is to iteratively find a q that approximates the
Boltzmann distribution, for higher and higher β.
However there are other target distributions that are
peaked about minimizers of G. In particular, given any
distribution p′, the distribution
θp(x) ≡
p(x)Θ[K −G(x)]∫
dx′ p(x′)Θ[K −G(x′)]
is guaranteed to be more peaked about such minimizers
than is p. So our minimization can be done by iterating
the process of finding the q that best approximates θp and
then setting p = q. This is analogous to the minimization
algorithm considered in previous sections, which iterates
the process of finding the q that best approximates the
Boltzmann distribution and then increases β.
For the choice of pq-KL distance as the approximation
error, the q that best approximates θp is just the product
of the marginal distributions of θp. So at the end of each
iteration, we replace
qi(xi) ←
∫
dx′(i)q
′
(i)(x
′
(i))Θ[K −G(xi, x
′
(i))]∫
dx′ q′(x′)Θ[K −G(x′)]
=
q′(G < K | xi)
q′(G < K)
=
q′(xi | G < K)
q′(xi)
where q′ is the product distribution being replaced. The
denominator term in this expression is known exactly to
agent i, and the numerator can be Monte-Carlo estimated
by that agent using only observed G values. So like gra-
dient descent on the Maxent Lagrangian, this update rule
is well-suited to a distributed implementation.
Note that if we replace the Heaviside function in this
algorithm with an exponential with exponent β, the up-
date rule becomes
qi(xi)←
E(e−βG | xi)
E(e−βG)
.
where both expectations are evaluated under q′, the dis-
tribution that generated the Monte Carlo samples. It’s
interesting to compare this update rule with the parallel
Brouwer update rule for the team game [11, 12, 19], to
which it is very similar.[39] This update is guaranteed to
optimize the associated Lagrangian, unlike the Brouwer
update. On the other hand, since it is based on the pq-
KL Lagrangian, as mentioned above there is no formal
guarantee that this alternative to Brouwer updating will
decrease E(G).
This update rule is also very similar to the adaptive
importance sampling of the original pq-KL approach dis-
cussed in [11]. The difference is that in adaptive im-
portance sampling the e−βG(x) terms get replaced by
e−βG(x)/q′(x).
Finally, consider using qp-KL distance to approximate
q′(x) e
β(K−G(x))∫
dx′ q′(x′)eβ(K−G(x′))
rather than pq-KL distance. In
7the Lagrangian for that distance the q′ terms only con-
tribute an overall additive constant. Aside from that con-
stant, this qp-KL Lagrangian is identical to the Maxent
Lagrangian.
V. CONCLUSION
Many problems in adaptive, distributed control can
be cast as an iterated game. The coupling between
the mixed strategies of the players arises as the system
evolves from one instant to the next. This is what the
system designer determines. Information theory tells us
that the most likely joint strategy of the players, given
a value of the expectation of the overall control objec-
tive function, is the minimizer of a particular Lagrangian
function of the joint strategy. So the goal of the sys-
tem designer is to speed evolution of the joint strategy
to that Lagrangian minimizing point, lower the expec-
tated value of the control objective function, and repeat.
Here we elaborate the theory of algorithms that do this
using local descent procedures, and that thereby achieve
efficient, adaptive, distributed control.
VI. APPENDIX
This appendix provides proofs absent from the main
text.
A. Derivation of Lemma 1
Proof: Consider the set of ~u such that the directional
derivatives D~ufi evaluated at x
′ all equal 0. These are
the directions consistent with our constraints to first or-
der. We need to find the one of those ~u such that D~uV
evaluated at x′ is maximal.
To simplify the analysis we introduce the constraint
that |~u| = 1. This means that the directional derivative
D~uV for any function V is just ~u · ∇V . We then use La-
grange parameters to solve our problem. Our constraints
on ~u are
∑
j u
2
j = 1 and D~ufi(x
′) = ~u · ∇fi(x
′) = 0 ∀i.
Our objective function is D~uV (x
′) = ~u · ∇V (x′).
Differentiating the Lagrangian gives
2λ0ui +
∑
i
λi∇f = ∇V ∀i.
with solution
ui =
∇V −
∑
i λi∇f
2λ0
.
λ0 enforces our constraint on |~u|. Since we are only in-
terested in specifying ~u up to a proportionality constant,
we can set 2λ0 = 1. Redefining the Lagrange parameters
by multiplying them by −1 then gives the result claimed.
QED.
B. Proof of claims following Lemma 1
For generality, we provide the proofs in the general
scenario where the private utilities gi may differ from
one another. See the discussion in Section III C.
i) Define fi(q) ≡
∫
dxiqi(xi), i.e., fi is the constraint
forcing qi to be normalized. Now for any q that equals
zero for some joint move there must be an i and an x′i such
that qi(x
′
i) = 0. Plugging into Lemma 1, we can evaluate
the component of the direction of steepest descent along
the direction of player i’s probability of making move x′i:
∂L
∂qi(xi)
+ λ
∂fi
∂qi(xi)
=
βE(gi | xi) + ln(qi(xi))
−
∫
dx′′i [βE(gi | x
′′
i ) + ln(qi(x
′′
i ))]∫
dx′′i 1
Since there must some x′′i such that qi(x
′′
i ) 6= 0, ∃xi such
that βE(gi | x
′′
i ) + ln(qi(x
′′
i )) is finite. Therefore our
component is negative infinite. So L can be reduced by
increasing qi(x
′
i). Accordingly, no q having zero prob-
ability for some joint move x can be a minimum of i’s
Lagrangian.
ii) To construct a bounded rational game with multiple
equilibria, note that at any (necessarily interior) local
minimum q, for each i,
βE(gi | xi) + ln(qi(xi)) =
β
∫
dx(i)gi(xi, x(i))
∏
j 6=i
qj(xj) + ln(qi(xi))
must be independent of xi, by Lemma 1. So say
there is a component-by-component bijection T (x) ≡
(T1(x1), T2(x2), . . .) that leaves all the {gj} unchanged,
i.e., such that gj(x) = gj(T (x)) ∀x, j [40].
Define q′ by q′(x) = q(T (x)) ∀x. Then for any two
8values x1i and x
2
i ,
βEq′(gi | x
1
i ) + ln(q
′
i(x
1
i ))
− βEq′ (gi | x
2
i ) + ln(q
′
i(x
2
i ))
=
β
∫
dx(i)gi(x
1
i , x(i))
∏
j 6=i
qj(T (xj)) + ln(qi(T (x
1
i )))
− β
∫
dx(i)gi(x
2
i , x(i))
∏
j 6=i
qj(T (xj))) + ln(qi(T (x
2
i )))
=
β
∫
dx(i)gi(x
1
i , T
−1(x(i)))
∏
j 6=i
qj(xj) + ln(qi(T (x
1
i )))
− β
∫
dx(i)gi(x
2
i , T
−1(x(i)))
∏
j 6=i
qj(xj)) + ln(qi(T (x
2
i )))
=
β
∫
dx(i)gi(T (x
1
i ), x(i)))
∏
j 6=i
qj(xj) + ln(qi(T (x
1
i )))
− β
∫
dx(i)gi(T (x
2
i ), x(i)))
∏
j 6=i
qj(xj)) + ln(qi(T (x
2
i )))
=
βEq(gi | T (x
1
i )) + ln(qi(T (x
1
i )))
− βEq(gi | T (x
2
i )) + ln(qi(T (x
2
i )))
where the invariance of gi was used in the penultimate
step. Since q is a local minimum though, this last differ-
ence must equal 0. Therefore q′ is also a local minimum.
Now choose the game so that ∀i, xi, T (xi) 6= xi. (Our
congestion game example has this property.) Then the
only way the transformation q → q(T ) can avoiding
producing a new product distribution is if qi(xi) =
qi(x
′
i) ∀i, xi, x
′
i, i.e., q is uniform. Say the Hessians of
the players’ Lagrangians are not all positive definite at
the uniform q. (For example have our congestion game
be biased away from uniform multiplicities.) Then that
q is not a local minimum of the Lagrangians. Therefore
at a local minimum, q 6= q(T ). Accordingly, q and q(T )
are two distinct equilibria.
iii) To establish that at any q there is always a direction
along which any player’s Lagrangian is locally convex, fix
all but two of the {qi}, q0 and q1, and fix both q0 and q1
for all but two of their respective possible values, which
we can write as q0(0), q0(1), q1(0), and q1(1), respectively.
So we can parameterize the set of q we’re considering by
two real numbers, x ≡ q0(0) and y ≡ q1(0). The 2 × 2
Hessian of L as a function of x and y is
( 1
x
+ 1
a−x α
α 1
y
+ 1
b−y
)
where a ≡ 1−q0(0)−q0(1) and b ≡ 1−q1(0)−q1(1), and
α is a function of gi and
∏
j 6=0,1 qj . Defining s ≡
1
x
+ 1
a−x
and t ≡ 1
y
+ 1
b−y , the eigenvalues of that Hessian are
s+ t±
√
4α2 + (s− t)2
2
.
The eigenvalue for the positive root is necessarily posi-
tive. Therefore along the corresponding eigenvector, L is
convex at q. QED.
iv) There are several ways to show that the value of
E
q
β
i
([gi]i,q(i) ) must shrink as β grows. Here we do so by
evaluating the associated derivative with respect to β.
Define N(U) ≡
∫
dy e−U(y), the normalization con-
stant for the distribution proportional to e−U(y). View
the xi-indexed vector q
β
i as a function of β, gi and
q(i). So we can somewhat inelegantly write E(gi) =
E
q
β
i
(β,gi,q(i)),q(i)
(gi). Then one can expand
∂E(gi)
∂β
= −
∂2ln(N(β[gi]i,q(i)))
∂β2
= −Var([gi]i,q(i))
where the variance is over possible xi, sampled according
to qβi (xi). QED.
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